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ABSTRACT
In We Have a Consensus on Fraud on the Market - And It’s Wrong,
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arguments that have been cited by numerous scholars: (1) the circularity
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gist is that SFCAs are both workable and necessary. But, in the end, Spindler
exposes weaknesses in the usual arguments against SFCAs that point the way
to still stronger arguments against SFCAs.
Regarding circularity, Spindler argues that SFCAs are workable
because it is possible, even with circularity, for investors to be compensated
in full, even though compensation is funded by a reduction in the aggregate
value of the defendant company, and thus the wealth of its stockholders
(including those who are compensated). But he fails to recognize that
because feedback magnifies buyer claims, it induces investors to spend that
much more on precaution and increases already excessive deterrence.
Moreover, it effects a transfer of wealth from diversified investors to stockpicking investors even though the law should encourage investors to
diversify.
Regarding diversification, Spindler argues that SFCAs are necessary
because one cannot diversify away fraud. But as shown here, the loss from
securities fraud is a mixture of diversifiable losses that someone will suffer
one way or the other (when the truth comes out) and undiversifiable losses
that derive from the cover-up of bad news. Bad things happen to good
companies. Sales decline. Risks increase. But such losses can be diversified
away because unexpectedly good things happen to other companies. In
contrast, if an ordinary loss is exacerbated by a cover-up leading to a loss of
investor trust (and an increased cost of capital) or cash outflows (from
litigation expenses or fines), such additional losses cannot be offset by
unexpected gains. There is no potential for gain from the absence of fraud.
The only losses that really matter are the losses that cannot be
diversified away. But these are losses suffered by the corporation that should
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give rise to a derivative action. Moreover, it turns out that derivative actions
are perfectly tailored to compensate investors and to provide perfectly
calibrated deterrence without the collateral damage caused by feedback.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In We Have a Consensus on Fraud on the Market - And It’s Wrong,
James Spindler argues that the near universal disdain of legal scholars for
+UW),O*OU+ R,p)V WLp++ pW*O12+ h“>`!A+”g O+ op+UV 12 *m1 4O+*pMU2 OVUp+B hKg
that compensation for securities fraud is impossible because recovery against
the issuer means that defrauded buyers effectively pay themselves (the
circularity critique) and (2) that most investors are diversified and thus suffer
no real harm from securities fraud since buy-side losses wash out from sellside gains on average and over time (the diversification critique). 1
Spindler purports to refute both of these arguments. But, the arguments
he refutes are not exactly the arguments against SFCAs. In other words,
Spindler resorts to the time-honored technique of misstating the opposing
argument in order to attack it. I do not mean to suggest that the arguments
addressed and refuted by Spindler have never been made. Rather, these
arguments have been supplanted by a more refined critique of SFCAs that is
far more compelling.
XU(U,*PULU++f >.O2VLU,:+ .OUWU O+ p (pL)poLU W12*,Oo)*O12 *1 *PU
extensive body of legal scholarship focusing on securities litigation if only
because it recounts the evolution of scholarly thinking about SFCAs. But,
his biggest contribution in this piece is in showing how the arguments against
SFCAs have been misunderstood. Thus, Spindler shows that the arguments
against SFCAs could be much clearer.

1. James C. Spindler, We Have a Consensus on Fraud on the Market - And It’s Wrong,
7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 67, 69-91 (2017). Technically speaking, Spindler confuses the fraud
on the market (“FOTM”) doctrine (a presumption of reliance) with SFCAs (a procedure and
a remedy). Id. at 73-77.
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II. CIRCULARITY AND FEEDBACK
Spindler summarizes his argument regarding circularity and feedback
as follows:
The circularity critique fails mathematically: as shown herein with
an economic model, penalties on the firm effectively come out of
the pockets of non-plaintiff shareholders, and actually do
W14.U2+p*U .LpO2*ORR+d =1 *PU Uk*U2* *Pp* *PU RO,4:+ +Pp,U+ Pp(U
been turned over during the effective period of the fraud, it is true
that the plaintiff class seeks recovery from a firm that they, in part,
own. But just as a non-pro-rata dividend transfers wealth, on net,
to its recipients, so, too, does the fraud on the market remedy.
What is more remarkable is that, under certain conditions,
compensation is full and complete. This is so because of a
feedback effect between damages and liability: prospective
liability decreases stock price, which increases prospective
liability, which decreases stock price, and so on. As illustrated
mathematically in Part III, infra, the interaction between turnover,
stock price, and damages works to fully compensate defrauded
purchasers.2
Spindler is correct that circularity does not preclude compensation. In
theory, buyers may be made whole, even though (as holders) they effectively
pay themselves a portion of any recovery, because most of the recovery
usually comes from non-buyer holders.3 But no one really argues that
2. Spindler, supra note 1, at 70.
3. Note that a securities fraud claim may arise from the cover-up of either bad news or
good news. In the former case, the plaintiff class comprises those who bought during the
fraud period, while in the latter case the plaintiff class comprises those who sold during the
fraud period. Although there are notable examples of good news cases (with seller classes),
the overwhelming majority of SFCAs involve the cover up of bad news (with buyer classes).
My own study of one random year revealed that 104 out of 106 cases filed involved the coverup of bad news. Thus, only two cases involved the cover-up of good news. Accordingly, the
discussion here assumes the context of a bad news case with a buyer class.
It is not surprising that companies might be more reluctant to disclose bad news.
Spindler would likely say that issuers always want to inflate the price of their stock (so they
can sell for too much if they should want to sell) but that the cover-up of good news would
serve only non-stockholder buyers. See James C. Spindler, Optimal Deterrence When
Shareholders Desire Fraud 3 (November 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3121230 [https://perma.cc/EU6R-UW2P] (stating that corporate
fraud arises from shareholder incentives). But SFCAs themselves may be the cause of this
dramatic skew since they cause stock price to fall further than it otherwise would in bad news
cases but to rise less than it otherwise would in good news cases. Thus, damages are
magnified in bad news cases and muted in good news cases (as discussed immediately below).
Note also that the analysis herein assumes that the subject matter securities fraud is
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compensation is impossible. Rather, the argument is (or should be) that
compensation is illusory for most investors because of the (hidden) losses
they suffer as holders. On average and over time, most stockholders are net
losers from SFCAs.
Moreover, as Spindler himself notes in the above quoted passage, the
prospect of payout by the defendant company causes stock price to fall
further than it would have in the absence of a class action remedy because of
the feedback effect. 4 As a result, SFCAs do more harm than good.
`1, Ukp4.LUf +)..1+U *Pp* AW4U "Lp+*O2Q !p.f ]2Wd h“A"!”g Pp+ oUU2
sued because it covered up information indicating that stock price should be
10% lower than it was before corrective disclosure T $9 per share rather
than $10 per share. Assume further that the plaintiff class comprises 20% of
outstanding shares. Because of the prospective payout to settle the class
action, stock price falls further to $8.75 per share (assuming full recovery).5
one in connection with trading in a common stock. It is quite possible for SFCAs to relate to
trading in fixed income securities (debt and preferred stock), but common stock is by far the
most common subject of SFCAs. Moreover, many of the issues discussed here do not arise
in the same way in connection with litigation relating to other securities. There is no real
circularity or feedback when recovery by some common stockholders comes from other
common stockholders. Diversification is a far less powerful factor in connection with fixed
income securities that seldom increase in value because of firm-specific factors.
4. Curiously, Spindler seems to view feedback as a good thing, stating that “circularity
and feedback operate together to preserve the net transfer to the plaintiff class at the level of
actual damages.” Spindler, supra note 1, at 93.
5. As far as I know, I was the first to identify and calculate the feedback effect. But
Spindler provides a derivation for the formula that I found by iteration. Spindler, supra note
1, at 92-102. For the mathematically inclined, the formula for calculating the feedback effect
in a bad news case is: total decrease (%) = expected loss (%) / (1 " % of damaged shares).
For example, if 50% of outstanding shares have a claim, then non-buyer holders lose double
what their loss would be in the absence of SFCAs. See Richard A. Booth, The End of the
Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 1, 24-27 (2007) (arguing
that SFCAs should not be treated as class actions but rather as derivative actions).
To be clear, the price change happens immediately upon corrective disclosure. The
market does not wait to see whether a SFCA will follow and how much it will cost to settle.
To be sure, the market may change its mind over time as the situation plays out. But there is
no way to know up front how much of the price decrease flows from a decrease in the
fundamental value of the defendant company (lower return or higher business risk) and how
much flows from feedback and other costs.
In a simple case where a single material fact is misrepresented for some period and
then completely disclosed, the number of damaged shares is equal to the number of additional
shares held by different shareholders as of the date of corrective disclosure relative to the
number held at the beginning of the fraud period. This number might be called unique
turnover and is equal to total volume net of in-and-out trading. See generally Robert A.
Alessi, The Emerging Judicial Hostility to the Typical Damages Model Employed by Plaintiffs
in Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 56 BUS. LAW 483, 483 (2001) (remarking on the
judiciary:s growing intolerance for the untested, speculative nature of a typical plaintiff:s
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In such a case, an investor who owns 1000 shares and who bought 100 of
those shares during the fraud period will recover $125 on the 100 shares
bought, but will lose $225 more on the 900 shares held from before the fraud
period than would have been lost in the absence of a class action remedy.
Specifically, stock price falls by an extra $0.25. So, a stockholder who holds
900 shares from before the fraud loses $0.25 ! 900 = $225.6 Moreover, the
recovery of $125 does not reflect any subtraction from the recovery for
attorney fees. If plaintiff attorneys receive 20% of the award, the stockholder
in the example would recover just $100. 7
damages model in security related class actions).
6. See Richard A. Booth, Index Funds and Securities Fraud Litigation, 64 S.C. L. REV.
265, 287 (2012) (discussing how index funds almost always lose more than they gain). It is
surprising that sophisticated investors seem not to grasp the problem. For example, the
general counsel of a major (index) fund manager once told me that it was remarkable how
much money they took in from class action settlements.
7. These calculations assume that the remedy works as intended and that the market
correctly assesses the effects of litigation. But the argument here does not depend on full
compensation of investors, nor does it depend on market efficiency. In the real world, buyers
never recover 100% of their losses. So, defendant companies never pay full freight. But, the
feedback effect obtains to the extent of any payout by the defendant company. Moreover,
bargaining happens in the shadow of the law. So, the measure of damages dictates where
negotiation starts.
Spindler notes that insurance may dampen the feedback effect. Spindler, supra note
1, at 100. This is obviously correct if SFCAs tend to settle for less than the full loss suffered
by buyers (say) because the class accepts whatever amount is available under a directors: and
officers: liability (“D&O”) insurance policy. It is also correct if insurers raise rates generally
rather than according to insured-specific claim experience (as appears to be common
practice). But if insurers do raise rates company-by-company in order to recoup payouts from
the companies whose claims have been covered, the effect will be to enhance feedback,
because the increased expense of insurance (including the mark-up charged by the insurer)
will reduce the returns generated by the insured company going forward and thus reduce stock
price by the present value thereof. Presumably, the insured company would be better off
borrowing to finance any settlement (unless its cost of new debt exceeds the markup charged
by the insurer). Even if rate increases are spread over many public companies (if insurers
decline to charge company-specific rates in light of claims experience), the cost of insurance
operates as a tax on public companies and investor returns (presumably exceeding the
aggregate payout to investors to the extent of insurer markup as noted above).
In addition, the market may overreact to bad news. The tendency of stock price to
overreact to bad news T giving rise to so-called crash damages T has been noted by scholars
and Congress itself in the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”)
of 1995. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1421, 1468 (1994) (concluding that the calculation of class damages under
current law is analytically flawed because it sweeps in elements of the market:s reaction to
bad news that are not within the legal definition of damages); Bradford Cornell & James C.
Rutten, Market Efficiency, Crashes, and Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443, 443
(2006) (arguing that a failure to understand implications of the efficient market hypothesis
introduces a significant plaintiff bias in securities class action litigation); Werner F.M.
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Although one might object to the assumption in the example that an
investor who owns 900 ABC shares buys an additional 100 shares of the
same stock, the fact is that such a scenario is quite common. It is standard
practice for index investors to buy or sell a few shares of portfolio stocks as
part of periodic rebalancing. Indeed, turnover for the S&P 500 is about 4.5%
annually.8 It follows that index investors always lose from SFCAs, and index
investors constitute more than 45% of the market (by value). 9
To be clear, it is not the argument here that one can diversify away the
effects of fraud. Rather, the argument is that diversified investors pay more
than they recover with SFCAs as the remedy for fraud. For them, the cure is
worse than the disease.
While the foregoing argument is compelling for a diversified
stockholder, a stock-picking investor will lose whenever she is a holder
rather than a buyer. Thus, the question remains whether the benefit is worth
the cost even for undiversified investors. 10 There is no doubt that an
aggrieved buyer would like this remedy from an ex post perspective. But the
question is whether investors want this remedy from an ex ante perspective.
In other words, as an investor who does not know if I will be a buyer or a
holder in any given case, would I prefer a system with or without SFCAs if I
understand that on average and over time I will pay more than I get back?
Admittedly, the same is true with any form of insurance. But people
DeBondt & Richard Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 40 J. FIN. 793, 804 (1985)
(explaining that the stock market may overreact to unexpected and dramatic news events);
Werner F.M. DeBondt & Richard H. Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and
Stock Market Seasonality, 42 J. FIN. 557, 579 (1987) (finding systematic price reversals for
stocks that experienced extreme long-term gains or losses); Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers,
Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 7, 7 (1994) (discussing how a “crash price” is an unreliable and economically unsound measure of damages). See also CONFERENCE REPORT ON PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at CCH ¶ 304 (1995) (designed to limit
frivolous securities lawsuits). Remarkably, none of these sources note that feedback may
contribute to crash damages.
8. S&P Capitalization Weighted Turnover, S&P DOW JONES INDICES, https://us.spindic
es.com/documents/additional-material/turnover.xlsx?force_download=true
[https://perma.cc/9QXA-VRJ5] (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
9. Annual Survey of Assets as of Dec. 31, 2016, S&P DOW JONES INDICES, https://www
.spindices.com/documents/additional-material/spdji-asset-survey-2016.pdf. As discussed
further below, the conflict of interests between index investors and stock pickers is legally
relevant in that it should preclude any class certification.
10. One:s preference may also depend on how often one trades. An active stock-picking
trader who holds one and only one stock for a few days or weeks at a time T who sells one
stock to buy another T is unlikely to suffer any loss as a holder except if the class period is
very short. For the record, average turnover among actively managed mutual funds is about
50% per year, and the average class period is about 300 days.
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still buy insurance. On the other hand, most people buy insurance only
against significant risks of loss that might be difficult to absorb in the
ordinary course. Think life insurance or fire insurance. Similarly, whether
one would favor SFCAs depends somewhat on whether one is a stockpicking investor who may have a lot of eggs in one basket or rather a
diversified investor. For a diversified investor, SFCAs are equivalent to
buying an extended warranty on a toaster. 11
The focus so far has been on the interests of investors as investors. But
feedback also has implications for deterrence because it magnifies the effects
of misspeaking to the market.
Most scholars seem to agree that SFCAs offer compensation that is too
generous.12 A lawsuit serves two important functions. One function is
compensation: To make whole someone who suffers harm because of the
actions of a wrongdoer. The other function is deterrence: To discourage
wrongdoing by imposing compensation. Ideally, these two functions should
complement each other. As Judge Learned Hand explained in a legendary
1947 decision, the law should provide compensation to victims only if the
cost to avoid the harm is less than the cost of the harm itself. 13 If
compensation is too generous, there will be too many lawsuits, and people
will be too careful.
To be sure, one might argue that there is no such thing as too much
deterrence for fraud. ")*f oj 4pQ2ORjO2Q *PU 4p,MU*:+ ,UpW*O12 *1 opV 2Um+f
managers will be induced to be that much more cautious when they speak,
which may well have a chilling effect on disclosure generally, with the result
that investors get less information than they would in the absence of
SFCAs.14
11. Although it may go without saying, it makes sense to insure against risks that cannot
be diversified away. One has many small appliances but only one life or house.
12. See, e.g., Spindler, supra note 1, at 77-86 (explaining that shareholder class actions
dealing with fraud on the market do indeed compensate defrauded purchasers despite
critiques).
13. See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding that
the liability of a defendant depends on if the burden of maintaining adequate precautions is
greater or less than the probability of the plaintiff:s injury multiplied by the gravity of the
resulting injury). This is essentially the same point ultimately made by the Coase Theorem.
See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 8-13 (1960)
(explaining that it is a judge:s decision to ensure that causation results in proper legal liability
being attributed to both parties). To be more precise, the Coase Theorem argues that the
placement of liability does not matter if the parties can negotiate with each other. See
generally, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 42-48 (3rd ed. 1986) (stating
that negotiations and mutually beneficial exchanges can limit damage costs for both parties
and result in an increase in overall value).
14. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases,

8

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:1

Moreover, there is no reason to think that the loss suffered by investors
constitutes optimal deterrence. As discussed further below, much of the loss
is typically unavoidable, but can be hedged away by diversification. The
effect of a misrepresentation is merely to delay disclosure of the truth, thus
shifting a loss that someone must suffer from one investor to another. Think
musical chairs. But this portion of investor loss can be diversified away. 15
Thus, feedback magnifies deterrence that is already excessive. Because
buyers can recover their entire loss (including the portion coming from the
normal vagaries of business), managers must be extraordinarily careful in
speaking to the market. This is especially true when a business is in flux
anyway with volume and volatility at a high as it often is in the context of
events that give rise to SFCAs. In such situations, the consequence of
misspeaking may be to give buyers the equivalent of a free put-option against
the company itself.
Although Spindler recognizes that feedback can cause damages to
exceed the value of the defendant company at the extreme, he seems to argue
that SFCAs do not really work as intended anyway because plaintiffs tend to
settle for whatever is available from insurance and because some defendants
turn out to be judgment proof. 16 But it is odd to defend a legal doctrine,
because in the real world it does not work as intended. 17
The ultimate point of the circularity critique is that damages are
excessive T and not that plaintiffs cannot be compensated. In short,
>.O2VLU,:+ +*p*U4U2* *Pp* RUUVopWM 1.U,p*U+ *1 p++),U R)LL W14.U2+p*O12
utterly misses the point. 18
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 640 (1985) (discussing the value of nondisclosure for investors and
their desire to reduce costs of finding out about firms and their securities).
15. Easterbrook and Fischel (writing in 1980 before Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224, 227-28 (1988) and the subsequent growth in SFCAs) suggested that the excess inherent
in a loss-based measure of damages might be justified as a substitute for punitive damages on
the theory that many cases of fraud go undetected. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at
633-34. It seems much more likely today, that although many cases are dismissed for lack of
merit, few, if any, meritorious claims fail to give rise to a SFCA.
16. Spindler, supra note 1, at 97-101.
17. I am reminded of the scene in which the Sundance Kid objects to jumping into a river
to escape pursuit because he could not swim, to which Butch Cassidy responds (laughing):
“Are you crazy? The fall will probably kill you anyway.” BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE
SUNDANCE KID (20th Century Fox 1969). To be fair, Easterbrook and Fischel make the
similar point that confusion about the correct approach to damages may avoid the excesses of
a loss-based approach to damages. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14 at 643-44
(explaining the difficulty in knowing whether loss-based measures are replacing profit-based
measures due to the lack of violations by firms while trading in the aftermarket).
18. Spindler:s critique of FOTM and SFCAs depends on a bit of legerdemain. By
discussing circularity and diversification separately, Spindler avoids discussing conflicting
stockholder preferences as by focusing first on the technical question whether it is
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It is important to recognize that securities fraud of the sort at issue in
most SFCAs does not necessarily involve gain to the issuer or the individuals
involved. So, there is no need for multiple damages as in cases of insider
trading.19 This distinction T between fraud with gain to the fraudster and
fraud without gain to the fraudster T also explains the distinction between
fraud in connection with offerings by issuers (1933 Act claims) and fraud in
connection with trading between stockholders (Rule 10b-5 claims).20 As
Spindler notes, scholars have argued that affording investors recovery for the
one does not imply they should also have a remedy for the other. But,
Spindler argues that investors do not care about the identity of the fraudster,
and thus that the distinction between actions arising under the 1933 Act
(involving offerings) and actions arising solely under Rule 10b-5 (involving
outstanding shares and open-market trading) is one without a difference.21
As he states:
Upon reflection, one sees that a sharp distinction between primary
trades and secondary trades is incorrect. In a zero-sum game
among secondary market traders, the players still try to win it,
expending resources to do so. Diversification changes nothing, as
Easterbrook and Fischel pointed out three decades ago, since all
investors (even diversified) would like to win more often than not.
]R )2O2R1,4UV *,pVU,+ +*p2V *1 R)2V 1*PU,+: “Pp2V+14U .,1RO*+” oj
trading against a better-informed party, they do not care whether
that other is an issuer or someone else. 22
Here again, Spindler misses the point. The argument is not about
whether there should be a remedy. The question is whether the remedy
should be a class action by which buyers are compensated for their losses by
mathematically possible for a class action remedy to work, which no one questions anyway.
See Spindler, supra note 1, at 92-113. Cf. HB Korenvaes Investments, L.P. v. Marriott Corp.,
No. 12922, 1993 WL 257422, at *19-21 (Del. Ch. July 1, 1993) (measuring fiduciary duty to
preferred stockholders in connection with spin-off by whether anti-dilution adjustment
remained workable). He then addresses diversification solely with regard to deterrence
(whether it will save investors the expense of research), thus missing entirely the peculiar
(though predominant) interests of diversified investors regarding the circularity problem.
19. Moreover, since the remedy is a class action (or derivative action as proposed here),
the potential for recovery extends to the entire loss. Thus, as in an ordinary consumer class
action, there is no need for punitive damages if all of the victims are made whole. See Richard
A. Booth, Senate Goes Back to the Future on Arbitration, CLS (COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL)
BLUE SKY BLOG (Dec. 5, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/12/05/senate-goesback-to-the-future-of-arbitration/ (explaining that it is unnecessary to multiply damages if all
victims are a party to the action).
20. Spindler, supra note 1, at 68-92.
21. Id. at 84-86.
22. Id., at 86.
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holders. The remedy under the 1933 Act is different: With disgorgement by
the company capped at the amount of the offering, the company and
investors are restored to the status quo ante. There is no feedback effect.
The remedy is perfectly congruent with both investor loss and fraudster gain
(ignoring the expenses of litigation). 23
There is no doubt that investors have an interest in deterring fraud. But
whether investors like SFCAs depends on whether there is any other remedy
that does not entail the collateral damage that goes with SFCAs. If not, the
idea that fraud should go unpunished may be too much to swallow even
though it may be in the interest of most investors to forgo any remedy. 24 So
investors might be willing to live with SFCAs (and the collateral damage
they cause) in the absence oR p2j pL*U,2p*O(Ud =P)+f >.O2VLU,:+ p,Q)4U2* p+
to circularity ultimately depends on the non-existence of other remedies. 25
In other words, the question is not whether there should be a remedy. Rather,
the question is what the remedy should be. Spindler himself is agnostic about
whether SFCAs are the best remedy. 26 While he defends SFCAs, he does
not claim that they are necessarily the best way to deal with securities fraud.
But he does argue that a loss-based remedy makes sense because investors
23. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 636-39 (discussing the issue of matched
gains and losses and the resulting minimal net harm). Spindler seems clearly to be focused
on the investor protection function of federal securities law, but capital allocation is also an
important goal. Spindler, supra note 1, at 73-77. See also Amanda Rose & Richard Squire,
Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1679, 1702 (2011) (arguing that business-tobusiness litigation may have important effects on the cost of capital for individual businesses
even though it is a zero-sum game for stockholders).
24. Nevertheless, Joseph Grundfest has proposed that the SEC could simply declare that
there is no private cause of action under Rule 10b-5, since the SEC presumably has authority
to repeal any rule it has adopted. Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action
Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961,
976 (1994).
25. There is considerable scholarship focused on the search for alternatives to FOTM
precisely for this reason. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action:
An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1561-66 (2006)
(explaining that academics have researched securities class action in the secondary market
context and have given very different responses in their research); see also Amanda M. Rose,
Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and
Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1325-49 (2008) (explaining
that academics have conflicting responses when they critically examine private enforcement
as a supplement to SEC fraud deterrence efforts). But no one has offered a workable private
remedy, except the one outlined here below.
26. Spindler, supra note 1, at 113. Accord Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 640
(expressing skepticism about the efficacy of proposals that fasten liability on managers for
harms they inflict on the securities market). Spindler:s point seems to be that there should be
some sort of remedy that shifts the cost of basic research onto someone who is better able to
bear it.
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will expend resources as a precaution against fraud if they can avoid losses
that exceed (or at least equal) the expense of precaution. 27 So the question
remains whether there is any better remedy for open-market securities fraud
that does not entail the circularity and feedback that go with SFCAs.
As it turns out, a derivative action is just such a remedy. Moreover, as
shown in the next section, a derivative action can be perfectly tailored to
compensate investors and penalize fraudsters for the true losses caused by
fraud. And since the company recovers from the wrongdoers, there is no
feedback. Rather, market capitalization (and stock price) should rise by the
amount of any recovery, thus compensating all investors pro rata.
III. DIVERSIFICATION AND FRAUD
Having dealt with the circularity problem to his own satisfaction,
Spindler then addresses the argument that diversified investors do not care
about fraud because gains and losses wash out over time. His key point is
captured in the heading for Part V of the article: You Cannot Diversify Away
Fraud. As he summarizes his argument:
The diversification critique fails because it is based on a core
misunderstanding of what diversification does, and does not, do.
In the most fundamental terms, diversification does nothing (1) to
negate fraud losses or (2) to counter the incentive to guard against
pricing error and asymmetric information. In any particular
transaction, an investor has an incentive to guard against
overpaying; if he does not, and if there is uncertainty regarding the
correct price, there is a risk of being expropriated by traders with
better information. Thus, the investor has the incentive to expend
.,UWp)*O12 W1+*+f +Up,WPO2Q R1, *PU +UW),O*j:+ *,)U .,OWUd ]2 p R1,4
1R *PU @,O+12U,+: tOLU44pf ooth buyer and seller expend search
costs, and each is made worse off. This remains true in the
diversified setting. If an investor buys one security and sells
another, there is a risk of being expropriated, in each trade, by
27. Spindler arguedB “While fraud on the market is not a panacea remedy [sic], the critics:
principal complaint T that fraud on the market fails to compensate T is untrue. As
demonstrated mathematically, the fraud on the market remedy of loss-based damages can
perfectly compensate defrauded purchasers. The feedback effect between damages and share
price declines arrives at just the right level of transfer to compensate purchasers both for the
initial price inflation as well as the decline in share price due to the firm:s liability.”
Spindler, supra note 1, at 101 (emphasis added). In contrast, Easterbrook and Fischel argued
that the optimal remedy would be one based on gain to the fraudster. Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 14, at 640. See Spindler, supra note 1, at 78-79 (stating “that an optimal rule would
tend to focus on the level of the <wrongdoer:s profits.:”).
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traders with better information; if he does not expend precaution
costs, his expected gains will be systemically [sic] lower.
Diversification does not guard against those systemically lower
returns. Similarly, where an investor purchases (or sells) a
diversified portfolio of securities, the investor certainly wishes not
to overpay (or be underpaid) for that portfolio; the relatively lower
firm-specific risk of the diversified asset does not moot that
concern.
(Drawing an example from recent history, the
diversification provided by a collateralized debt obligation (better
known, perhaps, as a CDO) did not moot the necessity of vetting
the underlying mortgages, as the 2007 financial crisis proved.)
The uninformed trader, confronted with price uncertainty and
potentially better-informed traders, will face expected losses. This
is true even across a multitude of trades, and without regard to
whether the trades are primary or secondary in nature.
Any investor (including a diversified investor), therefore, has incentives
to expend resources protecting herself from expropriation by other, betterinformed traders. Such precaution costs are analogous to the costs of
guarding against theft (such as purchasing locks or moving to a better
neighborhood), and constitute a deadweight loss to society. An extensive
financial economics literature details the problems created in such an
environment: illiquidity, adverse selection, and wasteful investment in
research and misreporting technologies. As just one facet of the magnitude
of such costs, a recent estimate puts the amount of money under active
professional management at more than $60 trillion in 2012, generating
(conservatively) at least $600 billion of active management fees per year (not
including performance-based fees); these are precaution costs. Such costs,
of course, do not diversify away. 28
To be clear, Spindler makes two points here. One relates to the power
of diversification. The other relates to who should bear the cost of
disclosure.
As for the power of diversification, Spindler is technically correct that
one cannot diversify away fraud T at least not true fraud. True fraud always
works to the advantage of the fraudster and against counterparties. 29 But
28. Spindler, supra note 1, at 71-72 (footnotes omitted).
29. I have made the similar argument that the business judgment rule protects only
decisions that involve diversifiable risks. Because decisions tainted by a conflict of interest
are at best fair to minority stockholders, and because decisions to undertake deals that at best
can break even are no-win transactions, such decisions are not protected by the business
judgment rule because the robust protections of diversification expected by common
stockholders do not apply. See Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and
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Spindler is not talking only about true fraud. As noted above, securities fraud
relating to open-market trading in outstanding shares (under Rule 10b-5) is
peculiar in that the fraudster does not usually gain from the fraud. Although
the fraudster may gain (for example, where a CEO sells her own shares
before disclosing bad news T a classic case of insider trading) most cases
do not involve insider gain. And those that do may result in criminal
prosecution or a claim by the corporation essentially for unjust enrichment. 30
Rather, in a case of open-market fraud the gain (or loss avoided) goes to
other stockholders T outsiders T who just happen to sell during the fraud
period.31 It is a bit odd to call this fraud since the fraud (if any) is perpetrated
for the benefit of someone other than the fraudster. To be sure, it can be
argued that managers may be motivated to keep stock price high just in case
they want to sell their shares (and incidentally for the benefit of existing
stockholders). But we generally expect (and want) managers to maintain the
highest possible stock price. 32 Thus, we might call this quasi-victimless
offense inflation fraud to distinguish it from classical fraud where the
perpetrator seeks to cheat the victim. 33
Bagholders (or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 THE BUS. LAWYER
429, 468 (1998) (stating that conflicts of interest may induce management to inflict losses on
a business).
30. See Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831, 837 (Del. 2011) (abrogating
Pfeiffer to extent that it held corporations could not recover for insider gains); Brophy v. Cities
Service Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7 (Del. Ch. 1949) (holding that there is a cause of action against an
employee who trades based on confidential information).
31. One might argue that the problems with SFCAs could be fixed by holding sellers
liable for the (effective) gains they enjoy from selling at an inflated price, however impractical
it might be to do so. Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Uneasy Case for
Limiting Shareholder Liability in Tort, 100 YALE L. J. 1879, 1880 (1991) (arguing that limited
liability should be abolished). But it is important to permit sellers to retain their gains for
diversification purposes T to be netted out against buy-side losses.
32. The law does not require companies or their managers to disclose everything
investors would want to know. Moreover, there may be good business reasons to delay public
disclosure of news (whether good or bad), for example, to facilitate negotiations. But
generally speaking, no such justification can excuse a positive misrepresentation. See Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1988) (noting that misrepresenting information to
induce a reliance upon a false statement is fraud; In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d
259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that corporations need not disclose information because
investors want to know it).
33. To be clear, the courts do not generally make much of a distinction between these
two varieties of fraud, although concomitant insider trading is usually sufficient to establish
scienter T one might call it scienter per se. See Richard A. Booth, The Missing Link Between
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud, 2 J. BUS. TECH. L. 185, 193 (2007) (stating that scienter
can be established by identifying unusual insider trading activity at the same time a fraud
occurred). Note also that the benefit (if any) to the fraudster in cases of inflation fraud is
typically far less than any class claim. See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 323 (6th
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The central point is that outsiders are equally likely to benefit from
inflation fraud as they are to suffer losses from it. Accordingly,
diversification does indeed afford protection against inflation fraud. In
contrast, claims arising under the 1933 Act are quite different since the issuer
is the primary beneficiary. Thus, issuer liability (through disgorgement)
makes perfect sense. 34
Cir. 1976) (reversing judgment against buyers in private insider trading case under which they
would have been required to compensate all sellers for their losses). In addition, the word
fraud is sometimes used to describe a breach of fiduciary duty T particularly a breach of the
duty of loyalty (DOL). This too is a bit of a stretch on classical concepts. Embezzlement is
not really fraud. It is theft. Here the Supreme Court has weighed in emphatically to hold that
fraud under Rule 10b-5 requires deceit T and thus speech. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008) (noting that under Rule 10b-5 liability
cannot be imposed absent a public statement); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (holding that fiduciaries treating shareholders unfairly but without
deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure are not violating Rule 10b-5). Then again, it
seems clear that insider trading and broker churning are recognized forms of securities fraud
that do not in fact require speech precisely because the fraudster is subject to a fiduciary duty.
See United States v. O:Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (holding that an attorney was liable
for trading on insider information of client company because of a fiduciary duty).
34. It is also curious that 1933 Act violations have come to be called fraud since the act
establishes a no-fault strict liability regime that affords investors a remedy for any
misstatement or omission of a material fact by an issuer in connection with an offering. But
it is easy to see how the law implied an additional remedy for the victims of open-market
inflation fraud. When a public company makes a public offering of additional shares, it can
be difficult or impossible to determine who bought the new shares. See In re Transkaryotic
Therapies, Inc., No. 1554-CC, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *8-13 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007)
(showing that it is difficult to ascertain who a beneficial owner of a stock is). But because
issuer liability under the 1933 Act is limited to the amount of the offering, tracing is required
to prove a claim. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding that the
plain reading of the 1933 Act is that tracing is required to prove a claim). Since investors who
buy in the aftermarket cannot prove that the shares they buy are part of the offering, it seems
only fair to permit them to claim under Rule 10b-5 if they can satisfy the heightened
requirements that they relied on a misrepresentation in the prospectus and that the issuer acted
with scienter. Indeed, one might argue that the issuer company in such cases derives a direct
benefit from keeping stock price high, to wit assuring the success of the offering. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 636-39 (noting that purchasers of the first issue in
the aftermarket can bring a suit against the issuer because the issuer caused the inflated price
just as the issuer inflated the new price). In any event, it is standard practice in the context of
1933 Act claims also to make a claim under Rule 10b-5. See Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983) (holding that the availability of a 1933 Act claim does
not preclude a Rule 10b-5 claim). It is a small step from there to making a stand-alone claim
under Rule 10b-5. See Richard A. Booth, The Missing Link Between Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud, 2 J. BUS. TECH. L. 185, 194 (2007) (noting that it became normal practice
to add a Rule 10b-5 claim to all claims under the 1933 Act). Nevertheless, it is puzzling to
hold the company liable for misrepresentations made by its agents. The usual explanation is
that this is a form of vicarious liability, as in cases of tort. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 7.08 (AM. L AW INST. 2006) (citing a case wherein a city was held vicariously liable
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As for who should bear the cost of disclosure, Spindler seems to define
fraud to include any situation in which one party to a trade is better informed
than the other. He argues that if some investors do research, all investors
must do research as long as the expense thereof is less than the gain (or loss
avoided). 35 Otherwise, investors who do research will gain at the expense of
investors who neglect to do research. So, investors do better in the aggregate
by shifting the cost of research to issuers in the form of mandatory disclosure
together with rules against fraud. And issuers enjoy a lower cost of capital
to boot.36 Thus, Spindler argues that investors would be worse off without
SFCAs because they would then be forced to do research that is cheaper to
handle by mandatory disclosure. In other words, his argument is a Coasean
one that SFCAs shift the cost of fraud (as he broadly defines it) onto issuers
as the cheaper cost avoiders. Indeed, it is arguably costless for companies or
their managers to avoid misrepresentation. In any event, SFCAs relieve
individual investors of the need to verify issuer reporting. Or so the
argument goes.37
for a police officer:s violations of federal law under ordinary tort principles); WILLIAM T.
ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 27 (5th ed. 2016) (noting that apparent authority is also a basis for imposing
vicarious liability). But it would seem more precise to see the misrepresentation as the act of
the company itself through its agents, as in cases of contract.
Incidentally, Spindler:s parenthetical aside T that losses from CDOs demonstrate the limits
of diversification T fails to recognize that in the stock market losses can be offset by gains
because companies sometimes do better than expected. But an investor who holds nonconvertible bonds can never do better than be paid the agreed return. This is not to say that
diversification has no value in connection with investments in debt securities. Rather, it is
only to say that it does not work as powerfully as it does with investments in common stock.
35. Without this limitation, research would spiral into an arms race: As some investors
increase spending on research, all will do so ad infinitum. This argument is a variation on the
efficiency paradox: If the market is efficient, investors will stop doing research, and the
market will no longer be efficient. The answer to this paradox is that as the market becomes
inefficient, investors do just enough research to exploit the inefficiencies. So, the fallacy in
the paradox inheres in looking at a dynamic system as if it must result in an all-or-nothing
solution rather than an equilibrium. SFCAs tend to destabilize this equilibrium by magnifying
the effects of any errors in disclosure.
36. Spindler concedes that if investors were somehow precluded from doing research,
they would be equally well off, but he dismisses this scenario as an unrealistic or degenerate
case. Spindler, supra note 1, at 106. See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and
Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 638 (1992) (discussing the distinction
between informed and uninformed investors).
37. Nevertheless, some scholars have questioned the value of mandatory disclosure
because, arguably, issuers would provide such information anyway in their own self-interest
to minimize the cost of capital. See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1995) (presenting an efficiency
justification for mandatory disclosure in security markets). By extension, there should be no
need for any legal remedy as an inducement: Companies will do the right thing because they
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Spindler is correct that the expense of precautions against true fraud is
a deadweight loss.38 So the law should impose a remedy shifting that loss to
whomever can avoid it at the least expense. Spindler makes no distinction
between precaution and research. He seems to see all investor research as
directed at detecting fraud (or at least misinformation). Thus, he argues that
companies should be liable for both. But unless one assumes that market
prices are normally accurate (as opposed to merely efficient), it seems
unlikely that investors spend much on detecting fraud. It seems much more
likely that investor spending relates to efforts to beat the market T to
identify instances of mispricing.
Spindler seems not to notice the irony in his observation that investors
spend as much as $600 billion annually on management fees that pay for
research in a system that already provides for mandatory disclosure as well
as a remedy for fraud in the form of SFCAs. 39 Moreover, and perhaps more
important, Spindler also fails to notice that because feedback causes
additional loss, investors will spend that much more on precaution. In other
words, there is good reason to think that SFCAs (by magnifying losses from
fraud) induce investors to waste even more resources on precaution than they
otherwise would do. 40
Again, Spindler seems to assume that SFCAs are the only possible
remedy. If there is some other remedy that would better induce issuers to
provide the appropriate level of disclosure, presumably even Spindler would
agree that SFCAs should be abolished. The question is whether there is some
other remedy that might do the job better. The answer can be found in a
careful analysis of the losses that can be recovered in an SFCA.
The extant rule is that buyers may recover the difference between
purchase price and the price following corrective disclosure (as adjusted for
any changes attributable to other causal factors, including background
want to do the right thing T like doing the dishes as famously argued in the movie The Break
Up. THE BREAK-UP (Universal Pictures 2006). But even Pangloss would allow that some
companies may cheat. See generally VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE (1759) (passim) (where Pangloss,
a pedantic tutor, is known for his fervent, yet misguided optimism). Thus, few seriously
question the value of mandatory disclosure or a remedy for fraud (as properly defined).
38. Spindler, supra note 1, at 71-72.
39. The $600 billion figure is apparently based on an estimate that US investors hold
about $60 trillion in equity and debt combined and spend about one percent thereof on
investment management. See B.101 Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit
Organizations, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (Mar. 9, 2017), htt
ps://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20170305/html/b101.htm (listing various assets and
liabilities of households and nonprofits).
40. One could argue that if the remedy worked to prevent fraud, feedback would be
eliminated, too. But in the real world, fraud seems to persist.
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changes in market prices generally). But this measure of damages comprises
several different components of loss, some of which are diversifiable.
Moreover, it turns out that the losses that cannot be diversified away are all
derivative in character and should give rise to a claim on behalf of the
company rather than against the company. Since other losses can be hedged
away by holding a diversified portfolio, it follows that SFCAs should be
abolished in favor of derivative actions.
Consider the following example. ABC Company trades at $10 per
share on expected earnings of $1.00 per share. Thus, the market applies a
10% discount rate to ABC. In other words, investors demand a 10% return
on an investment in ABC stock. A big customer of ABC cancels a contract,
which will result in a decrease in earnings to $0.90 per share. Other things
equal, one would expect the market price of ABC stock to decrease to $9 per
share. But as a result of the contract cancellation, the market has reassessed
the risk inherent in ABC and now imposes a 12% discount rate. Thus, the
price of ABC stock falls further to $7.50 per share. 41
If ABC discloses the contract cancellation promptly. No one has a
claim as a result of the decline in stock price. The losses suffered by
investors are ordinary run-of-the-mill losses that result from business risks
that investors willingly assume. As such, these losses can be diversified
away. They come out in the wash because on average and over time for
every ABC there is an XYZ that enjoys unexpected gains.
Now suppose that the CEO of ABC covers up the news of the contract
cancellation and the truth does not come out until ten months later. As a
result, investors who bought ABC stock during the ten-month fraud period
have a claim against the company for their loss. But the loss may well be
greater than the original $2.50 per share loss. For example, as a result of the
cover-up the market may lose trust in management and impose a higher 15%
discount rate. If so, stock price will fall to $6.00 per share.42 In addition, the
market may estimate that increased legal fees and a potential SEC fine will
further reduce company value by $1.00 per share because of the drain on
cash. So, the market may further bid down stock price to $5.00 per share.
Thus, what would have been a 25% decrease with prompt disclosure has
become a 50% decrease because of the cover-up.43
In all likelihood, this 50% loss will be further magnified by feedback
because the market will likely assume that a meritorious SFCA will be
filed.44 But ignoring the feedback effect for the moment, ABC stock price
41.
42.
43.
44.

0.90 / 0.12 = 7.50
0.90 / 0.15 = 6.00
1 T (7.50/10.00) = 0.25; 1 T (5.00/10.00) = 0.50.
This 50% decrease will be magnified by the feedback effect. Assuming that the
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would have fallen by 25% even with prompt disclosure. Instead, it has fallen
by 50% because of the cover-up. Presumably, even Spindler would agree
that stockholders have no claim in the absence of the cover-up and that the
first 25% loss can be diversified away. The fact that a SFCA has been filed
does not alter the fact that half of the loss is diversifiable. This portion of
the loss remains diversifiable irrespective of the cover-up.
The additional 25% loss that flows from the cover-up is different. In
the absence of the cover-up, ABC stock price would have been $7.50 per
share. Instead, it has fallen to $5.00 per share because of the cover-up. The
additional $2.50 decline is a deadweight loss that cannot be diversified away.
There is no prospect of an offsetting gain from another company because of
the absence of fraud. There is no reward for good behavior T except maybe
in prison. Moreover, and perhaps more important, it is a loss that could have
been avoided if the CEO had not covered up the facts.
This is a loss that is suffered by all of the stockholders (both those who
bought during the fraud period and those who held their stock from before),
because the value of the corporation has fallen by an additional $2.50 per
share as a result of management misbehavior. As such, this additional loss
is properly characterized as derivative rather than direct. It is a loss for which
the corporation should recover against the individual wrongdoers. 45
Needless to say, the corporation itself has no claim based on lower than
expected returns or a higher cost of capital because of an increase in business
risk perceived by the market. And legacy stockholders have no gripe as to
the first $2.50 loss. They would have lost the first $2.50 per share no matter
what. But this loss can be diversified away. Indeed, the sales lost by ABC
were likely gained by some XYZ. Although fraud-period buyers do have a
claim for the first $2.50 as the law currently stands, it is not clear that they
should do so since this is a loss that must be suffered by someone. Think
musical chairs. Perhaps more to the point, the timing of the loss (whether it
is disclosed immediately or at some later time) is irrelevant to whether it can
be diversified away. There is no reason to think that diversification does not
work to net out unexpected losses and gains over time. Indeed, there is every
reason to think that diversification works better over longer periods of time.
plaintiff class comprises 40% of ABC stockholders, and assuming the market thinks the SFCA
will be wholly successful, stock price will fall to $1.66 because of feedback: 0.50 / (1 - 0.40)
= 0.50 / (0.60) = 0.8333. Thus, a 50% loss becomes an 83.33% loss.
45. The extra (and avoidable) loss in the example derives from an extra increase in the
discount rate and from the prospect of a cash outflow. There may also be cases in which
lower returns can be traced to actionable misbehavior. For example, management may have
misrepresented the quality of its products and caused customers to cancel orders. But that
would give rise to a derivative claim, just as does an increase in the cost of capital from a loss
of trust or a cash outflow.
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For the law to provide recovery for inevitable and diversifiable losses
constitutes a windfall for investors who just happen to buy during the fraud
period: Buyers end up better off than they would have been in the absence
of fraud if the law provides recovery for losses that can be diversified away.
Moreover, deterrence becomes excessive T which is, not to mention, the
additional deterrence from feedback or the fact that it is misguided because
the company pays.46 To be sure, buyers never recover in full. But the
problem is that the company pays at all when it is the company that should
receive any recovery.47
The bottom line is that after netting out diversifiable losses, there is
nothing left other than derivative claims. Because he fails to sort out the
elements of harm, Spindler fails to notice that the only losses that matter are
derivative in nature and that a derivative action is perfectly tailored to
provide both compensation and deterrence. Then again, no one else seems
to have noticed this distinction either.
IV. DIVERSIFICATION AND MISPRICING
Assuming that fraud (intentional misrepresentation) can be addressed
by means of a derivative action as outlined above, what should we do about
the remainder of the loss suffered by investors who buy (or sell) during the
fraud period? The short answer is: Nothing.
46. To complicate matters further, the additional loss from feedback should also give rise
to a derivative claim. But it would be odd for the company to compensate buyers, as under
extant law, and then to seek recovery from the individual wrongdoers. At the very least, this
scenario should suggest that the recovery from the individual wrongdoers should go to the
buyers. In practice, this contradiction is effectively ignored by settling parallel derivative
actions for non-monetary governance reforms of dubious value.
47. The implicit assumption here is that the excess loss T the derivative claim T is the
correct level of deterrence. To be sure, this ordinary tort approach may not suffice in cases in
which the wrongdoer stands to gain. Although it seems likely that the derivative loss will
usually exceed any personal gain T probably many times over T the general rule is that
wrongdoers must also disgorge any gain. See Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P.,
23 A.3d 831, 838 (Del. 2011) (noting that it is an act of disloyalty for a fiduciary to profit
from information obtained through a confidential relationship, even if the advantage was not
gained at the expense of the fiduciary); see also Brophy v. Cities Servs. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 8
(Del. Ch. 1949) (maintaining that an employee cannot use secret corporation information for
his own personal gain). But see Tarnowski v. Resop, 236 Minn. 33, 39 (1952) (holding an
agent liable for both damage done to a principal:s business and improper benefits (bribes)
received in connection with service as an agent); cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at
634-35 (discussing tension between damages based on plaintiff loss and defendant gain).
Note also that a direct claim by buyers compensates only buyers for their share of the
derivative loss. The whole of the derivative loss may be greater than or less than the whole
of the direct (SFCA) recovery.
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Spindler argues that even diversified investors prefer to win (or at least
not to lose) in any given transaction:
The diversification critique fails because it is based on a core
misunderstanding of what diversification does, and does not, do.
Similarly, where an investor purchases (or sells) a diversified
portfolio of securities, the investor certainly wishes not to overpay
(or be underpaid) for that portfolio; the relatively lower firmspecific risk of the diversified asset does not moot that concern.
(Drawing an example from recent history, the diversification
provided by a collateralized debt obligation (better known,
perhaps, as a CDO) did not moot the necessity of vetting the
underlying mortgages, as the 2007 financial crisis proved.) The
uninformed trader, confronted with price uncertainty and
potentially better-informed traders, will face expected losses. This
is true even across a multitude of trades, and without regard to
whether the trades are primary or secondary in nature. 48
In essence, the argument is that a diversified investor can get killed by
a thousand tiny cuts. Spindler reasons that although an investor may
minimize risk through diversification, a diversified investor still has reason
to take precautions T albeit a somewhat reduced reason. Spindler observes
that if we think about each individual trade made by a diversified investor, it
is clear that she would prefer to buy or sell at a good price and would at least
worry that the price is skewed against her because other traders have better
information. 49
In the end, it is Spindler who misunderstands the effects (and power) of
diversification: By holding and maintaining a balanced portfolio of twenty
or more stocks, an investor can eliminate almost all of the risk that goes with
investing in one stock T about 70% of total risk. 50 The law of large numbers
dictates that over time and on average purchases of overpriced stocks will be
offset by purchases of underpriced stocks. 51 Ditto for sales ceteris paribus.

48. Spindler, supra note 1, at 71.
49. Id. Note that Spindler seems to be talking here about asymmetric information
generally T about the fact that investors worry that other investors may know more. On the
other hand, it could be that Spindler thinks that all asymmetry should be seen as fraud. See
also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 639-44 (noting that aftermarket fraud may give
rise to net harm but that it is likely to be a good deal smaller than the gross transfer of wealth
between sellers and buyers).
50. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 227-50 (1996)
(noting that an investor can eliminate investment risk by having a balanced portfolio of
stocks).
51. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 641 (stating that most gains and losses
in the market net out).
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And all the more so where one engages in many trades. 52 In other words,
through diversification an investor can eliminate all of the firm-specific risk
that goes with investing in an individual stock without any sacrifice of return.
The only remaining risk is market risk T the risk that the value of equity in
the aggregate will rise or fall. 53
It may be true that diversified investors worry about mispricing, but the
question is whether they would (or should) spend anything to identify
mispriced stocks given that they have hedged away the risk thereof by virtue
of being diversified. In other words, if one knows that occasional mispricing
will wash out, would one nevertheless spend (just a bit maybe) to identify
mispriced stocks so as to squeeze out a little more return? After all, the fact
that one is protected from loss does not necessarily mean that one would
leave money on table.
Or does it? The little-noticed flip-side of eliminating downside risk is
eliminating upside potential.54 In other words, a diversified investor is
protected against the risk of loss from normal (random) fluctuations in price.
But the protection is purchased using the random gains that come from the
same source.55
Consider the following model: Imagine a world with two companies.
Gunco is a defense contractor.56 In wartime, it generates a return of 20%
while in peacetime it generates zero return. Butterco is a consumer products
company. In peacetime, it generates a 20% return while in wartime it
generates zero return. Assume further that there is a fifty-fifty chance of war
or peace in any given year. Thus, the expected return for both companies is
52. Spindler, supra note 1, at 82-83.
53. See MALKIEL, supra note 50, at 242 (noting that only market risk remains when risk
is minimized by a diversified portfolio).
54. It may be that confusion about how diversification works is partly a result of
confusion about the meaning of risk itself. The essence of risk is volatility. It is not solely
about the danger of loss. It is also about the danger of gain (so to speak). Diversification is
a two-edged sword. While one can eliminate company-specific risk by holding a diversified
portfolio of stocks, diversification also eliminates the possibility of extraordinary gains.
55. Thus, Spindler:s parenthetical (quoted above) that CDOs demonstrate the limitations
of diversification misses an important difference between debt and equity T that returns on
equities can exceed expectations whereas returns on debt cannot. As noted above, the
maximum return one can receive with a debt instrument is the promised return (assuming
purchase at par). One can never do better unless interest rates fall generally or the risk inherent
in the issuer business declines. The promised return is the most one can expect.
56. WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE CASES AND MATERIALS 95-98 (7th ed.
2012). The following model is based on thU “tO(U,+OROWp*O12 p+ p YUp2+ 1R ?UV)WO2Q ?O+M”
O2 8OW*1, ",)V2Uj p2V Yp,(O2 !PO,UL+*UO2:+ Corporate Finance. VICTOR BRUDNEY & MARVIN
CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 995-99 (1st ed. 1972). See also MALKIEL, supra note 50,
at 236-37 (hypothesizing that a diversified portfolio:s return is constant irrespective of
situational factors).
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10% per year. Now suppose that you have $1000 to invest. If you invest all
of your money in either Gunco or Butterco, you can expect a return of $200
half of the time T $100 on average. But in some years your return will be
zero while in others it will be $200. It is possible that you will enjoy several
consecutive years of $200 returns, but it is also possible that you will suffer
several consecutive years of zero returns. On the other hand, if you invest
$500 in each company, your return will be $100 per year no matter what. In
wartime, a $500 investment in Gunco returns $100, while Butterco returns
zero. In peacetime, a $500 investment in Gunco returns $100, while Butterco
returns zero. Thus, a diversified portfolio generates a 10% return no matter
what happens. The expected return is 10% whether there is war or peace. 57
The question for present purposes is whether a rational investor would
spend anything on research (precaution) under the conditions posited by the
model. Clearly not. Once we have locked in the expected return at zero risk,
there is nothing to be gained. The only effect of doing research is to reduce
net return by the amount spent. Thus, the notion that an investor might
follow a diversification strategy and nevertheless do some research is
nothing but double-think. One might argue that it is possible to generate a
20% return by choosing one or the other company as the investment for the
year. But the chances of a 20% return are exactly the same as the chances of
a zero return. Similarly, one might argue that it might be possible to know
if there will be war or peace. But that is only to wish that the facts were
different. Ultimately, the idea that one can find stocks that will do better (or
worse) than they are expected to do is a self-contradiction.
Needless to say, the above model is unrealistic, but only because it
posits two stocks that perfectly mirror each other (whose expected returns
are perfectly inverse to each other). In the real world, most stocks move up
and down together (albeit in varying proportions) and not opposite each
other.58 Thus, it is impossible to eliminate the risk that stocks in general (the
market) will rise or fall. But we are concerned here only with firm-specific
risk.59 And it is quite possible to eliminate the risk that any given firm will
57. In statistical terms, the standard deviation of the diversified portfolio is zero. There
is no risk. In contrast, the standard deviation of each individual stock is a whopping 14.1%
on a 10% expected return.
58. There are a few stocks T for example, those of gold-mining companies T that tend
to move opposite the broader market. But there are too few such stocks to go around. And
their value for hedging purposes has likely been dissipated. In other words, the prices of such
stocks have been bid up because of their value for hedging.
59. As Judge Easterbrook states: “Securities laws require issuers to disclose firm-specific
information; investors and analysts combine that information with knowledge about the
competition, regulatory conditions, and the economy as a whole to produce a value for
stock.Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317, 1323-24 (7th Cir. 1988). Just as a
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perform differently than expected relative to the market by holding the
market. Indeed, the fact that the model is based on just two stocks with equal
expected return and risk effectively understates the power of diversification
in the real world where it is common practice to hold 500 or more stocks. 60
In the end, the model depends only on the notion that stock prices move
randomly (unpredictably). This assumption is consistent with real world
results. There is little doubt that the market is weak-form efficient: It is
impossible to predict the next move in price from the last move in price. In
other words, there is a fifty-fifty chance that a given stock is over-priced or
underpriced at any given moment. So, the odds are even that the next change
in price will be up instead of down. Or vice versa. 61
Spindler is correct that it is rational to spend on research if the cost is
less than (or even equal to) the benefit. But if the benefit is zero, no cost can
be justified. The point is not that one cannot beat the market but rather that
there is no reason even to try if risk can be eliminated. Diversified investors
might want to win with every trade but only if it is completely costless to do
so.
It follows that a diversified investor must minimize expenses. Since
there is no benefit that can come from spending on research, to spend
anything more than the minimum for investment management is a waste of
money that serves only to reduce net return. Diversified investors should be
opposed to SFCAs for the same reason, since SFCAs purport to compensate
investors (at least in part) for losses that can be diversified away. So, the
cost of this protection is itself a deadweight loss.
Nevertheless, it seems possible for some investors to obtain better firmspecific information. For example, an investor might somehow figure out
that Gunco should be expected to generate a 30% return if war breaks out.
If this prediction is based on material nonpublic information obtained
improperly from within the company, there are remedies for that although

firm needn:t disclose that 50% of all new products vanish from the market within a short time,
so Commonwealth Edison needn:t disclose the hazards of its business, hazards apparent to all
serious observers and most casual ones.” Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d
509, 515 (7th Cir. 1989).
60. It is no worry that companies generate different rates of return as long as the rate of
return is proportional to the risk inherent in each company. And the possibility that the market
may get it wrong is itself a risk that disappears with diversification.
61. See 2015 IBBOTSON STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS, AND INFLATION (SBBI) CLASSIC
YEARBOOK 90-97 (2015) (recording changes in stock prices); MALKIEL, supra note 50, at 16493 (stating the benefits of maintaining a diversified portfolio, instead of attempting to predict
the future price of stock).
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they may not always work perfectly. 62 But if this information (so called) is
really a matter of opinion T based on new analysis of available information
T it is not worrisome. Indeed, the market would not work if traders did not
have differing opinions about stock values.
Few would argue that it is problematic that better information comes
out over time and that market price may change as a result or indeed that
some traders may gain therefrom as first movers. Investors expect prices to
change. An investor cannot decline to invest simply because of the worry
that the price of a stock may go up or down (thus implying that the current
price is somehow incorrect). Moreover, ordinary investors (including
diversified investors) are better off if market prices adjust faster to new
information. And the best way to assure rapid adjustment is for those with
better information to trade on it. 63
Spindler assumes that investors care equally about all forms of
asymmetric information. Wrong. Investors care about fraud because it
causes stock prices to diverge from fair price. But passive investors do not
necessarily care if active investors have better information, even if it means
passive investors lose a bit in a given trade. Indeed, passive investors gain
from research by active investors because it causes stock price to converge
on fair price, increasing market efficiency (and integrity), which is all quite
consistent with the policy behind FOTM. In other words, passive investors
free-ride on the efforts of active investors. 64 So passive investors should not
62. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100704, 102 Stat. 4677, (1988) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 78t-1 (2018)) (providing for a treblethe-gain fine in cases of insider trading); Securities Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. §
243.100 (2000) (prohibiting selective disclosure by public companies).
63. There is no reason for active investors to engage in research unless they can capture
some gain by doing so. Cf. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) (noting that to outlaw
trading on all nonpublic information would discourage investors from doing research). By
conflating fraud with unequal information generally, Spindler misses the point that there is
good asymmetry and bad asymmetry. In any event, securities law does not seek to assure
equal information. It seeks only to provide the facts that a reasonable investor would want to
know. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 447 (1976) (stating that
disclosure requirements seek to provide information that a reasonable investor might consider
important in order to enable informed decision making). Incidentally, the ongoing debate
over electronic trading is essentially parallel: Is it better for trades to be executed as quickly
as possible before prices change or is it better to gather as many orders as possible so as to
discover the best price? It is also reminiscent of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle: It is
ultimately impossible for markets both to adjust rapidly to new information and to assure that
everyone gets the same price. One must choose speed or perfectly equal treatment.
64. One might say that passive investors T indeed most investors T are price-takers in
the argot of economics. The same is true in the debt market. Indeed, auctions of treasury
securities are set up to accommodate such investors by permitting bidders to submit
noncompetitive bids to purchase specified amounts of an offering at whatever price is
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object to paying a bit by ceding some gain to active investors. 65 After all,
there is no such thing as a free lunch.
In sum, the power of diversification does not depend on the accuracy
of market pricing. Indeed, the greater the chances of mispricing, the more
important it is for an investor to diversify. If market prices were 100%
accurate, there would be no need to diversify. But neither would there be
any reason to engage in costly research.
Still, even if the market is weak-form efficient, as seems certain, it is
conceivable that stock prices are skewed to the high side. Spindler and others
have argued that issuers are motivated to maintain high stock prices for the
benefit of current stockholders. After all, there are only two things one can
do with shares that one owns: One can hold. Or one can sell. And even
though a stockholder may have no existing plan to sell, it is preferable for
the issuer to keep stock price as high as possible just in case one decides to
sell.66 If the market is so skewed, investors will quite rationally spend on
established by competitive bidding.
65. By extension, one could argue that passive investors should be happy to allow active
investors to recover via SFCAs and that feedback losses operate as a tax of sorts on diversified
investors that ultimately supports the research of active investors. See Jill E. Fisch,
Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333,
347 (2009) (noting that indexing is devastating to markets because it makes everyone a free
rider). This is a variation on the efficiency paradox that if investors really believed in market
efficiency they would stop doing research, and the market would cease to be efficient. The
problem is that much, if not most, of the recovery goes to random free-riding passive investors
who happen to have bought during the fraud period. See Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs
and Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 627-34 (1992) (discussing the
difficulties around fraud deterrence in light of passive investors). Moreover, most research is
focused on identifying mis-valued stocks. Few investors engage in research to ferret out
fraud. Nor is it likely that research will expose fraud. Thus, research begins where mandatory
disclosure ends. So, it makes no sense to provide a remedy. Finally, active traders do not
need compensation. They will do the research anyway.
66. See James C. Spindler, Optimal Sanctions for Misreporting when Shareholders
Desire Fraud 3 (Nov. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://ssrn.com/a
bstract=3121230 [https://perma.cc/EU6R-UW2P] (discussing issuer incentive for elevated
share prices based on stockholder preference for higher reported value); James C. Spindler,
Vicarious Liability for Bad Corporate Governance: Are We Wrong About Rule 10b-5?, 13
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 359, 367-74 (2011) (discussing maximization of shareholder welfare
through the preservation of elevated stock prices); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
“Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay on Compensation and Deterrence in Securities ClassAction Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243, 245-47 (2009) (discussing shareholder responsibility
for market integrity). Indeed, we know from experience with SFCAs that bad news cases
outnumber good news cases by about fifty-to-one. In other words, the vast majority of SFCAs
involve situations in which the issuer has covered up bad news presumably in an effort to
keep stock price higher than it should be T inflated as the courts tend to say. But the skew
in SFCAs may also be the result of feedback or the seemingly natural tendency to delay
disclosure of bad news.
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precaution T a deadweight loss that could be avoided if we could deter
fraud.
There are several responses. First, if there is a tendency for stock prices
to be inflated, there is every reason to believe that the market will discount
stock prices accordingly. Second, there is reason to believe that stock prices
tend to be a bit low. The Delaware courts have held that market prices do
not constitute competent evidence for appraisal purposes because they reflect
an inherent discount (possibly because deal price almost always includes a
premium over market price).67 Indeed, appraisal awards on the average equal
about 150% of pre-deal market price. 68 Moreover, stock prices are
effectively set by what the next buyer is willing to pay as reflected in the bidask spread.69 Third, this argument ignores some good reasons why
companies might also want to keep stock prices low from time to time. For
example, a company may plan to repurchase shares or to issue compensatory
stock options. Or a company may want to discourage holders of convertible
securities from exercising conversion rights. Finally, even though it seems
unlikely that inflation fraud (so to speak) is a serious problem it turns out
that diversification in practice addresses this possibility as discussed further
below.
V. DIVERSIFICATION IN PRACTICE
The foregoing analysis has been based on a simplistic view of
diversification: That investors can eliminate most of the risk that goes with
investing in individual stocks (without any sacrifice of return) by holding a
portfolio of twenty or more different stocks. But there is more to
diversification. Intuitively, a portfolio of twenty different technology stocks
or twenty different energy stocks would be over-exposed to industry-specific

67. See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and
Puzzling Life of the ‘Implicit Minority Discount’ in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 4-7 (2007) (discussing Delaware case law with respect to minority discounts in
appraisal proceedings); Richard A. Booth, Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in
Appraisal Proceedings, 57 BUS. LAW. 127, 138-45 (2001) (discussing the application of
minority discounts in appraisal proceedings under Delaware law).
68. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of
Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1598-1604 (2015) (discussing average
appraisal awards).
69. See generally Richard A. Booth, The Efficient Market, Portfolio Theory and the
Downward Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1187, 1203-07 (1993) (discussing
share prices as a function of downward sloping demand theory). Similarly, Ibbotson suggests
that the market imposes a liquidity discount. See 2015 IBBOTSON STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS, AND
INFLATION (SBBI) CLASSIC YEARBOOK 123 (2015) (estimating the cost of capital).
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risk: A stockholder who holds a portfolio of twenty stocks in a single
industry remains exposed to the risks peculiar to that industry and thus
assumes some risk that can be avoided with more diversification. So,
diversification depends on the number and distribution of portfolio shares.
But how do we know which stocks to include and in what proportions?
The market provides the answer. By holding (say) the 500 largest
stocks in proportion to the market capitalization of each, an investor can be
assured that invested funds are distributed according to an impartial
assessment of business opportunities economy-wide.70 In effect, the market
allocates capital to companies (and industries) through the pricing process.
Presumably, companies invest where they find potential for return. 71 So by
holding the 500 or 1000 or 1500 largest stocks in proportion to the market
capitalization of each portfolio company, one effectively allocates funds in
proportion to returns available economy-wide.72
This explains the logic of investing in an index fund based on the valueweighted version of the S&P 500 (SPX).73 Since size is directly proportional
to returns, investing in an SPX index fund assures an investor that funds are
distributed as broadly and evenly as possible across the entire array of
business opportunities.74 The logic of doing so is more than mimicry for its
own sake.75

70. To be precise, the index holds stocks in proportion to public float rather than the total
of outstanding common stock.
71. If ABC generates a 20% return while the rest of the market generates 10% return, the
market will bid up the price of ABC until its return is consistent with the 10% average return
from the rest of the market. Other things equal, ABC should double in value.
72. To be sure, it is conceivable that there are industries that are populated wholly by
relatively small companies (or indeed private companies). For example, it seems unlikely
that the index reflects the business of law or other professional practices. So, it is possible
that a portfolio based on all publicly traded stocks is somewhat under-diversified in some
ideal sense. But it is not clear that there is anything to be done about it.
73. SPX is the ticker symbol for the most widely followed version of the S&P 500 T the
version that measures price return only (without reinvestment of dividends).
74. The S&P 500 represents about 80% of the value of the entire US market. In other
words, the other 3000 or so US public companies account for just 20% or so of the total value
of publicly held equity. To be clear, the S&P 500 is composed solely of US stocks. One can
diversify further (globally) by holding foreign stocks in addition to US stocks. Indeed, the
US market accounts only for about 40% of world market. On the other hand, US companies
presumably invest globally. So, international diversification is built in to some extent.
Moreover, by limiting the index to US stocks, variations in governance, business norms,
liquidity, market structure, and foreign exchange are neutralized, thus assuring apples-toapples comparison, which may also explain why so many widely followed indices are
similarly limited to companies from a single country.
75. Indeed, one might argue that index investing is really quite aggressive in that it seeks
to ferret out every possible source of return.
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In contrast, if one were to invest in an equal-weight portfolio T for
example, the equal-weight version of the S&P 500 (SPW) T one would
effectively invest the same amount in the largest company therein (AAPL,
which was worth $888B as of year-end 2016) as in the smallest company
therein (URBN, which is worth $2.46B).76 While holding an equal-weight
portfoli1 m1)LV p(1OV .LpWO2Q IdD3 1R 12U:+ 412Uj O2 AA@Z h1, po1)* Jb3
1R 12U:+ 412Uj O2 *PU *U2 Lp,QU+* O2VUk W14.p2OU+gf O* m1)LV pL+1 4Up2 *Pp*
41+* 1R 12U:+ 412Uj mp+ O2(U+*UV O2 *PU +4pLLU+* O2VUk W14.p2OU+d 77
Although smaller companies tend to generate higher returns, it is not clear
what would be the rationale for investing in an equal-weight portfolio. Still,
it turns out that the risk inherent in SPX is only slightly less than that inherent
in SPW.78 In any event, an investor who picks stocks to hold in a diversified
portfolio other than in proportion to market capitalization is not truly
diversified T or, at least, not as diversified as she might be. In other words,
to be truly diversified one must invest in a value-weighted portfolio.
The question is: Why would index investors trade at all (other than to
add to or subtract from assets under management)? Given that trading entails
some cost (if only in brokerage commissions), why not follow a strict buyand-hold strategy? The answer is that indexing compels some trading in
order to maintain holdings in proportion to market capitalization. Stock
prices rise and fall. So, every now and then the market portfolio must be
rebalanced.
The practice with the S&P 500 (the index itself) is to rebalance
quarterly, while the leading SPX ETF (SPDRs) rebalances at least monthly.79
76. See PDR SERVICES LLC, SPDR S&P 500 ETF TRUST PROSPECTUS 33-37 (2017),
http://quote.morningstar.com/fundfiling/Prospectus/2017/1/19/t.aspx?t=SPY&ft=&d=c89aa2b84f2884869d37e2b7a32977d3
(listing the relative rankings); S&P 500 Equal Weight Index, S&P DOW JONES INDICES,
http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500-equal-weighted
[https://perma.cc/9VWYRVUA] (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (indexing values of company worth).
77. Incidentally, it turns out that one needs to invest in about 500 stocks in order both to
hold a size weighted portfolio and to invest no more than about 4% by value in the largest
stock therein. As noted above, most of the benefits of diversification can be achieved by
holding twenty different stocks T which translates into investing no more than 5% in any one
stock. Not so coincidentally, the Investment Company Act of 1940 includes a rule to the same
effect T that for a fund to hold itself out as diversified it may not invest any more.
78. As of November 30, 2017, SPX had a ten-year STD of 15.08% while that of SPW
was 17.76%, both based on total returns. S&P 500 Equal Weight Index, S&P DOW JONES
INDICES, http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500-equal-weighted [https://perma.cc/9V
WY-RVUA] (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
79. See S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P 500 FACTSHEET (as of November 30, 2017)
(Quick Facts / Rebalancing Frequency); SPDR S&P 500 ETF TRUST, PROSPECTUS (January
19, 2017) at 51-54. http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500 and https://us.spdrs.com/
public/SPDR 500%20TRUSTPROSPECTUS.pdf.
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But the trading prompted thereby is minimal. For the year 2016, turnover
for SPX itself was 4.49% and was an even lower 4% for SPDRs. 80 In
contrast, the average turnover rate for equity funds is 26% as of 2016.81
Assuming that roughly half of investor funds are indexed, and assuming a
26% average turnover rate for all funds, it must be that average turnover
among managed funds is about 50% per year. 82 Thus, index investors are
almost always holders in the context of SFCAs. Translated into dollars,
index investors stand to recover about $4 for every $50 recovered by other
investors. More important, index investors effectively fund the difference. 83
Quite aside from the fact that indexing entails very little trading,
>.O2VLU,:+ W,O*O-)U hmPOWP p++)4U+ *Pp* VO(U,+OROUV O2(U+*1,+ U2QpQU O2 p
multitude of trades) ignores the fact that it is possible to trade portfolios as
portfolios via exchange-traded index funds as well as options and futures.
While it is likely that many individual stocks in the S&P 500 (for example)
are mispriced at any given moment, it is difficult to believe that the index is
wrong. Indeed, it would be nonsense for an investor so to assert and
irrational to act on any such belief. This is not to say that the S&P 500 cannot
rise or fall T or that an investor might predict that it will rise or fall. But
that is quite different from saying that the index is mispriced. Moreover,
even if there is reason to worry that the S&P 500 is mispriced, there is no
obvious way for an investor to take precautions against mispricing.
Presumably, Spindler himself would agree that it would be foolish for an
index investor to take any steps to guard against the possibility that other
investors have better information about the S&P 500. 84 Moreover (and
80. See S&P 500 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, CAPITALIZATION WEIGHTED TURNOVER (as
of Nov., 30, 2017); SPDR S&P 500 ETF TRUST, PROSPECTUS, (January 19, 2017) at 2.
81. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK, 38
(57th ed. 2017), available at https://www.ici.org/pdf/2017_factbook.pdf (noting that the longterm average turnover for the period 1984 to 2016 is 57%).
82. See E-mail and attachment from Nicolas Stable, Manager, NYSE Reference Desk,
ICE, to Richard A. Booth, Martin G. McGuinn Chair in Bus. Law, Villanova Univ. Charles
Widger Sch. of Law (Nov. 15, 2018, 10:44 AM EST) (on file with author) (recording that the
average turnover rate for NYSE group listed stocks has been 45% to 179% (monthly) during
the period 2007 to September 2018). Note that turnover rate as reported both by ICI and NYSE
has been dropping steadily over the last ten years, presumably because of investor movement
into index funds (at least in part), although index ETFs themselves contribute significantly to
NYSE Group turnover.
83. Needless to say, the outcome is even worse for buy-and-hold investors. On the other
hand, buy-and-hold investors will not be members of a plaintiff class except when adding or
subtracting funds to an investment account and thus may not have standing to object to class
certification.
84. It quite possible to bet that the S&P 500 will rise or fall in price by buying or selling
index futures and other derivative instruments. But such speculation is different from taking
precautions against mispricing. On the other hand, program trading (index arbitrage) may be
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again), we are concerned here only with company-specific information
because SFCAs are filed against individual companies.
Nevertheless, someone must manage an index fund and do the trades
that keep it in balance. If some of those trades happen at incorrect prices,
the effects will flow through to the net asset value (NAV) of the fund.
It turns out that even if prices of individual stocks are skewed to the
high side against buyers T which seems doubtful T portfolio-balance
trading (PBT) effectively neutralizes any such bias. PBT requires the
purchase of stocks that have risen in value (winners) and the sale of stocks
that have declined in value (losers). By definition, an index fund must buy
and sell portfolio securities in equal dollar amounts (ignoring inflows or
outflows). In other words, PBT is a zero-sum game. So, assuming that
upward bias in prices (if any) is uniformly distributed throughout the
universe of stocks, any loss from such mispricing on purchases should be
offset by a gain on sales. It all comes out in the wash.
Admittedly, PBT provides another reason why issuers (and their
managers) may want to keep stock price high T to maximize demand from
the large segment of the market that is indexed. Indeed, studies have shown
that the addition of a stock to an index causes its price to rise a bit (and vice
versa).85 Thus, indexing may give rise to a feedback effect of its own: Higher
stock price means higher demand from index funds. And vice versa.
Note also that because PBT is based on the past performance of
portfolio stocks (over as long as three months), index funds (and indeed the
index itself) must lag the market in individual stocks. Accordingly, index
investors effectively cede some gain to first-movers the active traders who
collectively effect real change in the prices of individual stocks. On the other
hand, ETFs (as well as program trading strategies) provide a second level of
protection since the price of derivative instruments may vary from the index
itself. If investors think the index is overpriced, they can bid down the price
of the ETF accordingly. So, there is good reason to think that trading by
index investors neutralizes much of any advantage that goes to active traders
(and indeed may exploit its own mirror advantage).
The point (so far) has been that index investors do not in practice trade
very much and that when they do trade, they trade in such a way as to
seen as a way to guard against mispricing. See Richard A. Booth, The Uncertain Case for
Regulating Program Trading, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 63 (noting that program trading
may in the long run benefit specialists by implementing it when markets return to
equilibrium).
85. See Jeffrey Wurgler, On the Economic Consequences of Index-Linked Investing
(Nat:l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 16376, 2010) (arguing that index-linked
investment has the effect of altering stock prices and risk evaluations relative to payoffs).
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neutralize any issuer efforts to keep stock prices inflated. It follows that
index investors should be opposed to SFCAs insofar as they purport to
compensate investors for ordinary losses coincident with fraud T
unavoidable losses from bad luck that someone must suffer. As for any
portion of a loss that is attributable to fraud and thus avoidable, index
investors would prefer recovery by the company by means of a derivative
action. In other words, the point has been that investors that do diversify do
not need (nor should they want) the protections afforded by SFCAs.
Quite aside from investor preferences, there are powerful arguments
that investors should diversify and that the law should thus assume that
ordinary investors are diversified (whether or not they are in fact diversified).
In other words, we should encourage diversification as a matter of public
policy. But SFCAs do just the opposite: They effectively subsidize
(irrational) undiversified stock-picking investors at the expense of (rational)
index investors.86
As shown at length above, an investor can avoid all company-specific
risk without any sacrifice of expected return by holding a diversified
portfolio of stocks. And one can do so at zero cost. (Although such a
strategy entails some expense in the form of brokerage commissions, the
same is true of stock-picking). Moreover, an investor can minimize such
expenses by investing in an index fund. Management fees associated with
index funds are significantly lower than those associated with actively
managed mutual funds. The Investment Company Institute (ICI) reports that
the average-expense ratio paid by investors in actively managed equity funds
is 0.82% as of 2016 (which does not include sales loads T one time entry or
exit fees T that average another 1.1%). In contrast, the average-expense
ratio for equity index funds is 0.09% annually. 87 Indeed Schwab offers index
funds with expenses of 0.03% and zero sales load. 88 And Fidelity has just
introduced a fund with zero management fees. Coincidentally (or not),
studies show that on average managed funds underperform the market by
about the amount of management fees and that the number of funds that beat
86. Many scholars, including Daniel Kahneman, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, have
emphasized the importance of default rules that incline individuals to do the right thing.
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
The argument against SFCAs is even stronger in that the choice is binary: Either the law
provides a class action remedy or it does not.
87. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 81, at 38.
88. CHARLES SCHWAB, SCHWAB EQUITY INDEX FUNDS PROSPECTUS, Schwab S&P 500
Index Fund 1-3 (May 31, 2018), available at http://hosted.rightprospectus.com/SF/Fund.asp
x?cu=808509855&dt=P [https://perma.cc/B9QV-ZUBB]. For SPDRs, the expense ratio is
0.0945% per year. PDR SERVICES LLC, supra note 76, at 2.
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the market several years running is about the number one would expect based
on chance. If I flip a coin enough times, it will occasionally come up heads
several times in a row. But that does not mean I have skills.89
Third, given that diversified investors have hedged away all firmspecific risk, they are willing to pay more for the stocks in which they invest.
In other words, diversified investors drive market prices: Since diversified
investors assume less risk, they are willing to pay more for stocks.
Accordingly, the growth of diversification (and indexing) has effectively bid
up the price of equities generally. 90 This also implies that investors who
choose not to diversify effectively pay too much by assuming more risk than
necessary for the same return. Thus, investors have no real choice but to
diversify.91
The bottom line is that it is irrational for most investors not to diversify.
But to diversify is to render research a waste. Thus, it is also irrational to
89. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK D OWN WALL STREET 177-84 (1996)
(summarizing research that demonstrates how managed funds do not necessarily outperform
the market due to this added level of management expertise). To be sure, an investor can
avoid management fees altogether by constructing and maintaining a portfolio from scratch.
But the expenses associated with a do-it-yourself portfolio are significant. Mutual funds pay
about one cent per share in brokerage commissions when they trade whereas the $5 or so per
trade charged by the deepest discount brokers works out to five cents per share assuming a
round lot of one hundred shares. To be sure, mutual funds may also suffer additional implicit
costs because their trades affect market prices. But individuals may suffer similar costs
because of high-frequency trading (HFT) practices. Note that fund-level brokerage
commissions are not included in the expense ratios set forth above because commissions are
deemed to be expenses borne by the fund itself and not part of the management fee charged
by the adviser. But since index funds trade far less than actively managed funds, commission
expenses can be assumed to be proportionally smaller for index funds. See generally Roger
Edelen et al., Shedding Light on “Invisible” Costs: Trading Costs and Mutual Fund
Performance, 69 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 33 (2013) (describing the various hidden costs of fund
trading and their effect on investor returns).
90. Over the period 1930 through 2016, increasing P/E ratios have accounted for 0.62%
in price return. See Richard A. Booth, Appraisal Rights and Economic Growth 11 (Dec. 5,
2017) (unpublished manuscript), (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082862
[https://perma.cc/VG6C-MYCM]) (noting “that 0.62% of price return is attributable to a
general increase in the value of equities as measured by the forward price/earnings ratio”). It
seems quite likely that this element of growth has been the result of increasing diversification
as well as declines in commissions and other expenses of investing. See Richard A. Booth,
Five Decades of Corporation Law, 53 VILL. L. REV. 459, 466 (2008) (stating that in the 1980s
“as brokerage commissions fell, it became almost costless to assemble a diversified
portfolio.”).
91. By analogy to Gresham’s Law (“bad money drives out good money”), one might say
that diversified investors drive stock-pickers from the market since stock-pickers are forced
to pay prices that are determined as if there is no firm-specific risk. Call it Booth’s Law. In
other words, stock-pickers assume additional risk without the prospect of any additional
return.
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spend anything more than the minimum possible amount on investment
management.
To be clear, this logic does not necessarily apply to investors who seek
to influence the business strategies of individual firms. Think Warren
Buffett. For such investors, expected returns derive from active participation
in management. For them, it is no contradiction to expect return to exceed
expected return (so to speak). But activist investors (hedge funds, private
equity funds, and other investors who seek to influence the management
strategies of target businesses) must pay the premium prices that are
effectively set by diversified investors. 92
To be sure, it could be argued that such investors (who are rationally
undiversified) need the protection offered by SFCAs. Moreover, it seems
quite unlikely that legal remedies make much difference to the trading
activity of such investors. But given that such investors tend to invest
relatively large amounts, they often will have an adequate incentive to sue if
defrauded. They do not need a class action remedy. 93 Indeed, it has become
increasingly common for such investors to opt out of SFCAs in favor of
pursuing individual recovery, which is problematic in itself. 94
VI. TRANSFORMING CLASS ACTIONS INTO DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
The point of this essay (to this point) has been to respond to the
arguments of James Spindler as to why the widely accepted academic
critique of SFCAs should be rejected. In other words, the point has been to
92. Since such investors typically must also pay a premium over market price in order to
gain control whatever the level, it follows that they must perceive significant room for
improvement. This should be somewhat reassuring to those who suspect that such investors
are focused on short-term returns or otherwise seek to promote policies that are inconsistent
with the interests of stockholders and the broader economy.
93. Nor do they need the benefit of the FOTM presumption of reliance even though the
courts have held that the presumption applies even in the context of an individual action. See
GAMCO Inv:rs, Inc. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A., 838 F.3d 214, 217-18 (2d Cir. 2016)
(demonstrating the willingness of an investment company to bring an individual securities
fraud action separate from a class action lawsuit).
94. See Amir Rozen et al., Opt-Out Cases in Securities Class Action Settlements 20122014 Update, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 1, 6 (2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publicatio
ns/Reports/Opt-Out-Cases-in-Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2012-2014 (finding “over
50 percent of class actions with settlements above $500 million (and 75 percent of such cases
in 2012 to 2014) had opt-outs.”). This trend is disturbing in that it may permit large investors
to appropriate funds available for recovery to the exclusion of small investors and without the
protections afforded in the context of a class action T which is not to mention the bigger
point argued here that recovery should go to the company. See Smith v. Waste Mgmt., Inc.,
407 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiff:s individual claims were barred by res
judicata due to prior settlement against defendant on behalf of all stockholders).
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explain why the arguments against SFCAs are indeed valid T albeit with
some tweaking. Nevertheless, as noted more than once up to now, Spindler
is correct that some sort of remedy for fraud is necessary if only for purposes
of deterrence. But no one has seriously suggested otherwise. The problem
is that no one has proposed a compelling alternative (present company
excluded).
As I have argued here and elsewhere, derivative actions solve all of the
problems that beset SFCAs and provide tailored deterrence and
compensation that is perfectly proportional to the genuine (undiversifiable)
harm suffered by investors. There is no feedback because the company
recovers. And because the company recovers only to the extent that it suffers
harm as a company, a derivative action affords recovery only for the portion
of a loss that cannot be diversified away.
The obvious objection to supplanting SFCAs with derivative actions is
that individual defendants are likely to be largely judgment proof T unlikely
to have the personal wealth necessary to fund a settlement that makes much
difference. There are several responses.
First, the potential damages award in a derivative action is likely to be
quite small in comparison to that in a class action wherein the measure of
damages includes not only the harm to company but also diversifiable losses
and feedback (notwithstanding the fact that the loss is limited to that suffered
by buyers).
Second, SFCA settlements are typically funded wholly by D&O
insurance.95 Although it has been argued that D&O insurance will not cover
claims by a company against its own directors, officers, and agents, there
appear to be significant exceptions to this pattern. 96 Moreover, there is no
doubt that insurers would provide such insurance if there was demand for it.
Witness the invention of earnings insurance a few years back. 97 And since
companies already pay for coverage against SFCAs the same funds could be
95. Kevin LaCroix, D&O Insurance to Fund Entire “Largest Ever” $139 Million News
Corp. Derivative Suit Settlement, THE D&O DIARY (Apr. 23, 2013),
https://www.dandodiary.com/2013/04/articles/shareholders-derivative-litigation/doinsurance-to-fund-entire-largest-ever-139-million-news-corp-derivative-suit-settlement/
[hereinafter D&O Insurance to Fund “Largest Ever” Derivative Suit]; Kevin LaCroix, About
the AIG Derivative Settlement, THE D&O DIARY (Sept. 11, 2008), https://www.dandodiary
.com/2008/09/articles/shareholders-derivative-litigation/about-the-aig-derivative-settlement/
[hereinafter About the AIG Derivative Settlement].
96. D&O Insurance to Fund “Largest Ever” Derivative Suit, supra note 95; About the
AIG Derivative Settlement, supra note 95.
97. See Richard A. Booth, Reducing Risk Doesn’t Pay Off, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1999,
at A18 (describing earnings-protection insurance as a new way for companies to protect
themselves from the effects of unexpected low earnings).
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diverted to coverage against derivative actions. To be sure, such insurance
would be for the benefit of high-level officers and thus might be seen as a
form of compensation. 98 But so be it. In the end, the company is no worse
off.
It may suffice simply to describe the advantages of derivative actions
without suggesting how such a change might be implemented. But it is
relatively easy to get from here to there.
First, the character of an action (whether it is derivative or direct) is a
matter for the court to determine.99 So the courts could simply declare that
SFCAs should be litigated as derivative actions.
Second, the conflicting interests of diversified investors, who should
disfavor class certification for the reasons laid out above, as well as the
impracticability of defining a class of investors who would favor class
certification should preclude class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). It is
simply impossible for anyone to be an adequate class representative where
half of the class would be opposed to the position advocated. 100
Third, Rule 23(b)(3) requires that a direct class action for money
damages be superior to other means of resolving the dispute. Since a
derivative action is perfectly tailored to the task, the superiority requirement
cannot be satisfied (at least if a litigant argues for a derivative action or the
court determines to act on its on motion). 101
98. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 640 (1985) (noting that individual liability would lead directors,
officers, and other agents to demand more compensation).
99. See Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1039 (Del. 2004)
(outlining the test for the court to use to determine whether the action is a derivative or direct
claim). See also LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 126-27 (3d Cir. 2008) (demonstrating
a derivative claim brought by shareholders); Smith v. Waste Mgmt, Inc., 407 F.3d 381, 385
(5th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiff:s claims were derivative under Delaware law); Cowin
v. Bresler, 239 U.S. App. D.C. 188, 741 F.2d 410, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that
appellant:s common law claims must be brought on a derivative basis); Shirvanian v.
DeFrates, 161 S.W.3d 102, 110 (Tex. App. 2004) (finding that shareholders: claims were
derivative under Delaware law). Cf. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook
R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 715-18 (1974) (holding that since the plaintiff does not meet the
contemporaneous ownership requirement, he has no standing to pursue a derivative action).
100. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940) (holding that a class action is
inappropriate where some members of the class are opposed to the position taken by the
representative plaintiff). Moreover, there is no apparent way to define the class so as to
segregate class members who would oppose the action from those who would favor the action.
Cf. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013) (finding that class certification was
improper where plaintiff could not show that damages could be awarded on a class-wide
basis).
101. In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) also requires the court to considerB “(B) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class
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One potential difficulty is that the plaintiff corporation in a derivative
action is unlikely to be a purchaser or seller and thus will not have standing
to sue under Rule 10b-5 because of the Blue Chip Stamps doctrine.102 In the
end, this is not a problem because the action may proceed in state court, and
state law clearly recognizes such claims. 103 Although the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) of 1998 sought generally to
preempt securities litigation in state court, the so-called Delaware carve-out
expressly permits derivative actions. Thus, one could argue that Congress
has impliedly endorsed the solution proposed here (although it seems quite
unlikely that it did so consciously).104
members,” and “(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum.” Interestingly, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1, which governs derivative
actions, was part of Rule 23, which governs class actions, until 1966 when the two were
divided into separate sections. Thus, one could argue that the issue whether a claim should
be handled as a class action or derivative action is essentially one of management by the court
(which is also a factor to be considered under Rule 23) as where the court must decide what
type of class action is most appropriate. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
338, 361 (2011) (ruling that employment discrimination actions must proceed under Rule
23(b)(3) rather than Rule 23(b)(2)).
102. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-56 (1975). See, e.g.,
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1968), (discussing a derivative action
in which the purchaser-seller requirement was met). It may also be a problem that the
corporation:s cause of action is not one sounding in deception. See Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462- 63 (1977) (finding that corporate mismanagement does not fall under
rule 10b-5).
103. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998) (holding that the complaint
adequately stated claim for breach of duty of loyalty based on insider trading); Pfeiffer v. Toll,
989 A.2d 683 (Del. Ch. 2010) (explaining the distinction between a derivative claim based on
financial harm to the corporation as a result of securities fraud and insider trading by directors
and a claim for damages or disgorgement based on stockholder losses). See also Kahn v.
Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831, 837 (Del. 2011) (abrogating Pfeiffer to hold that
a corporation could not recover for insider trading gains); Brenner v. Albrecht, No. 6514VCP, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 20, at *19-23 (granting the motion to stay the state law derivative
action until the resolution of the federal securities fraud class action).
104. It is not clear that the Blue Chip Stamps doctrine should apply in the context of a
derivative action. Since the doctrine is judicially crafted, the courts have the power to make
exceptions where appropriate. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547
U.S. 71, 86 (2006) (construing SLUSA connection requirement independently of judicially
imposed Blue Chip Stamps standing requirement). For example, it may suffice that a
corporation has suffered harm in the form of an excess decline in market price because traders
have reacted to managerial misbehavior. Although the foregoing argument as to why the
federal courts might hold that a derivative cause of action may arise under Rule 10b-5 may
seem to be a stretch, Exchange Act §16(b) expressly contemplates derivative recovery by the
corporation in connection with short-swing trading by insiders. Moreover, the danger at
which the doctrine was aimed T litigation over trading that might or might not have happened
in the absence of misinformation T is not a problem where the harm to the corporation is
measurable and finite.
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Moreover, it should not matter whether the action arises under federal
or state law as long as it provides appropriate deterrence. And there is good
reason to think that a claim will lie under state law in any situation in which
a meritorious claim will lie under federal law (as discussed further below).
One likely argument against supplanting SFCAs with derivative actions
is that derivative actions are subject to a variety of procedural hurdles such
as the requirement of demand on the board of directors (BOD). Moreover,
a derivative action can be voluntarily dismissed on motion by the BOD or a
special litigation committee (SLC) thereof. Finally, most corporations have
adopted charter provisions that exculpate directors (and officers) from
liability to the corporation for mismanagement. 105
Needless to say, SFCAs are themselves subject to a variety of
procedural hurdles as well. And often the litigation over such matters ends
up being dispositive. So, it is not clear that the peculiar rules relating to
derivative actions would be a more significant impediment for plaintiffs. If
anything, the ever evolving rules relating to class actions seem to be more
complex.
As for the possibility of voluntary dismissal by BOD or SLC motion or
under an exculpatory charter provision, the rule has evolved that where the
individual wrongdoers (directors or officers or other agents of the
corporation) have acted with scienter, demand will be excused and an
exculpatory charter provisions will not apply because of the requirement of
good faith.106
105. In addition, recent scholarship has suggested that derivative actions tend to reduce
stockholder wealth. See Adam B. Badawi & Daniel L. Chen, The Shareholder Wealth Effects
of Delaware Litigation, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV 287, 287-326 (2017) (summarizing
scholarship that demonstrates that derivative actions can reduce shareholder wealth). But as
noted therein, this may owe to the fact that most derivative actions are settled for nonmonetary governance reforms or disclosure, which itself may owe (in part) to the inherent
inconsistency between recovery from the corporation (in SFCAs) and recovery by the
corporation (as would be normal in a derivative action). And that is not to mention the oftennoted point that insurance may not cover derivative settlements (for a variety of reasons). In
other words, we do not know how the market would react to the prospect of derivative actions
supplanting SFCAs. It is conceivable that the prospect of recovery by the corporation would
have the effect of muting the effects of events that currently result in significant price declines
not only because feedback is eliminated but also because the market anticipates that the
corporation will recover from the wrongdoers.
106. See In re The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. S:holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 Del
Ch. LEXIS 151, at *42 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (holding that “failure to act in good faith
requires conduct that is qualitatively different from, and more culpable than, the conduct
giving rise to a violation of the fiduciary duty of care (i.e., gross negligence).”); In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005) (concluding that there was
no gross negligence and thus no breach of a fiduciary duty of care). See also Stone v. Ritter,
911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (adopting a good faith standard for a breach of a fiduciary duty
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While it might be argued that scienter may mean something different in
the context of a state law fiduciary duty claim than what it means in the
context of a claim arising under Rule 10b-5, fiduciary duty as interpreted by
the Delaware courts incorporates a duty of candor that would appear to make
any misrepresentation that is actionable under federal law also actionable
under state law assuming a showing of harm to the corporation (which is just
as it should be).107
Moreover, one distinct advantage of litigating securities fraud in the
context of a derivative action is to dispense with the scienter requirement as
applied under Rule 10b-5 where its function is to distinguish between
actionable misrepresentation and merely negligent misrepresentation. As
demonstrated at length here, the proper measure of recovery in a derivative
action is the loss in excess of what would be expected from corrective
disclosure alone. The problem with direct T class T recovery under Rule
10b-5 is that it depends on a judgment call as to the culpability of the speaker.
The fit is less than perfect. Scienter is not congruent with merit. And it is
inevitable that the courts will sometimes get it wrong. In contrast, the focus
in a derivative action is on whether the corporation suffered any measurable
harm (or the individual defendants were unjustly enriched). No harm. No
foul. And no need to delve into the mental state of the actors. In other words,
the market can provide the answer. If corrective disclosure results in no
greater change in stock price than would be expected from the new
information disclosed T if no additional harm is done T there is no need
for recovery. To be sure, it is not necessarily a simple matter to determine
whether a corporation has suffered excess loss. But it seems preferable to
try rather than to rely on the extant measure of damages that overof care).
107. See In re infoUSA, Inc. S:holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 990 (Del. Ch. 2007) (finding
that directors violate their fiduciary duty where it can be shown that they issued
communication with the knowledge that it was deceptive or incomplete, because stockholders
are entitled to honest communications from directors given with complete candor and in good
faith even in the absence of a request for stockholder action); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5,
16 (Del. 1998) (holding that a stockholder plaintiff can demonstrate a BFD by showing that
the directors “deliberately misinform[ed] stockholders about the business of the corporation
either directly or by a public statement.”). See also Pfeiffer v. Toll, 989 A.2d 683, 708 (Del.
Ch. 2010) (holding that a stockholder may maintain a derivative action against directors and
officers for losses suffered by the company as a result of federal securities law claims against
corporation by buyers). Indeed, since the law of fiduciary duty reaches a wide range of
misbehavior beyond misrepresentation, state law provides a more comprehensive remedial
scheme than federal securities law. To be sure, not all corporations are incorporated in
Delaware. But it seems likely that the courts of other states will look to Delaware law in this
area because of the expertise of the Delaware courts derived from the large number of such
cases litigated there in courts that specialize in such matters.
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compensates buyers and over-deters managers. 108
Admittedly, a derivative action does nothing to compensate sellers in
good-news cases: If good news is covered up and stock price rises with
corrective disclosure, those who sold at a too-low price during the fraud
period gain nothing from recovery by the corporation. But good-news cases
are quite rare, because feedback in such cases operates to dampen any
increase in price and thus to reduce the damages that the plaintiff class might
recover (whereas feedback has the opposite effect in bad news cases), or
possibly because companies tend to be eager to disclose good news. In any
event, my own research indicates that fewer than one in fifty SFCAs is a
good-news case. Thus, it is ironic that many of the most notable judicial
decisions relating to SFCAs have involved aggrieved sellers in good-news
situations.109 One solution to this problem might be to permit SFCAs in
good-news cases T in effect to require defendant companies to disgorge the
gains captured for the benefit of buyers and holders. Note that in a goodnews context, a class action would undo the effects of feedback and would
afford the correct level of deterrence. 110 Thus, consistent with the arguments
for a derivative remedy in the context of bad-news cases, one argument for
permitting SFCAs in the context of good-news cases is that a derivative
action is an inferior remedy. 111

108. In contrast, there is no reason to presume scienter from the fact of loss under Rule
10b-5 because the measure of damages includes ordinary diversifiable losses that are going
to happen one way or the other. Admittedly, the approach to scienter suggested here largely
dispenses with any need to litigate the matter. Rather, scienter is effectively presumed where
there is excess loss. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 644 (noting that the scienter
requirement may operate to calibrate the excesses of a loss-based measure of damages).
109. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (demonstrating an influential
case brought by aggrieved sellers that accused the corporation of material misrepresentation);
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (ruling against the aggrieved sellers:
complaint that accused the corporation of wrongly completing a short-form merger); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that Congress did not intend
to extend a private cause of action for loss of the opportunity to purchase due to an overly
pessimistic prospectus); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972)
(awarding damages to the aggrieved sellers); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968) (demonstrating a case brought by the SEC on behalf of aggrieved sellers after
the defendants traded on inside information not available to the public).
110. At the risk of sounding a bit gee-whiz, it is really quite amazing how the law works
(almost as a living thing) to provide solutions even to the most convoluted problems.
111. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 1955) (awarding damages to
minority stockholders in a derivative action claim did not fully reimburse their losses).
Perlman is akin to a 1933 Act remedy in reverse. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In We Have a Consensus on Fraud on the Market - And It’s Wrong,
James Spindler has attempted to defend securities fraud class actions
(SFCAs) and the fraud-on-the-market (FOTM) doctrine by purporting to
refute two arguments that have been cited by numerous scholars: (1) the
circularity (feedback) critique and (2) the diversification critique. In essence,
>.O2VLU,:+ QO+* O+ *Pp* >`!A+ p,U o1*P m1,MpoLU p2V 2UWU++p,j. But in the
end, Spindler fails to accomplish his goal. Quite to the contrary, he succeeds
in exposing weaknesses in the usual arguments against SFCAs that
ultimately point the way to still stronger arguments against SFCAs.
Regarding circularity, Spindler argues that SFCAs are workable
because it is possible even with circularity for investors to be compensated
in full even though compensation is funded by a reduction in the aggregate
value of the defendant company and thus the wealth of its stockholders
(including those who are compensated). Spindler recognizes that circularity
gives rise to feedback and thus (where the class comprises buyers) causes
stock price to fall further than it otherwise would do. But he fails to
recognize that because feedback magnifies buyer claims, it induces investors
to spend that much more on precaution and increases already excessive
deterrence. Moreover, and more important, it effects a transfer of wealth
from diversified investors to stock-picking investors even though the law
should encourage investors to diversify.
Regarding diversification, Spindler argues that SFCAs are necessary
because one cannot diversify away fraud. But as shown here, the loss from
securities fraud is a mixture of diversifiable losses that someone will suffer
one way or the other (when the truth comes out) and undiversifiable losses
that derive from the cover-up of bad news. Bad things happen to good
companies. Sales decline. Risks increase. But such losses can be diversified
away because unexpectedly good things happen to other companies. In
contrast, if an ordinary loss is exacerbated by a cover-up leading to a loss of
investor trust (and an increased cost of capital) or cash outflows (from
litigation expenses or fines), such additional losses cannot be offset by
unexpected gains. There is no potential for gain from the absence of fraud.
The only losses that really matter are the losses that cannot be
diversified away. But these are losses suffered by the corporation that should
give rise to a derivative action. If we sort out the sources of loss suffered by
investors in SFCAs, it turns out that derivative actions are perfectly tailored
to afford a remedy for the true harm addressed in SFCAs while providing
perfectly calibrated deterrence without the collateral damage caused by
feedback.

